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Abstract
A widely applied diversification paradigm is the naive diversification choice heuris-
tic. It stipulates that an economic agent allocates equal decision weights to given
choice alternatives independent of their individual characteristics. This article pro-
vides mathematically and economically sound choice theoretic foundations for the
naive approach to diversification. We axiomatize naive diversification by defining it
as a preference for equality over inequality and derive its relationship to the classical
diversification paradigm. In particular, we show that (i) the notion of permutation
invariance lies at the core of naive diversification and that an economic agent is a
naive diversifier if and only if his preferences are convex and permutation invariant;
(ii) Schur-concave utility functions capture the idea of being inequality averse on top
of being risk averse; and (iii) the transformations, which rebalance unequal decision
weights to equality, are characterized in terms of their implied turnover.
Keywords: naive diversification, convex preferences, permutation invariant pref-
erences, Schur-concave utility, inequality aversion, majorization, Dalton transfer,
Lorenz order.
JEL Classification: C02, D81, G11.
1 Introduction
Diversification is one of the cornerstones of decision making in economics and finance. In
its essence, it conveys the idea of choosing variety over similarity. Informally, one might
say that the goal behind introducing variety through diversification is the reduction of
risk or uncertainty, and so one might identify a diversifying decision maker with a risk
averse one. This is indeed the case in the expected utility theory (EUT) of von Neumann
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and Morgenstern (1944), where risk aversion and preference for diversification are exactly
captured by the concavity of the utility function which the decision maker is maximizing.
However, this equivalence fails to hold in more general models of choice. We refer to De
Giorgi and Mahmoud (2016) for a survey on the notion of diversification in the theory of
choice.
In the context of portfolio construction, standard economic theory postulates that an
investor should optimize amongst various choice alternatives by maximizing portfolio re-
turn while minimizing portfolio risk, given by the return variance (Markowitz 1952). In
practice, however, these traditional optimization approaches to choice are plagued by tech-
nical difficulties.1 Experimental work in the decades after the emergence of the classical
theories of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Markowitz (1952) has shown that
economic agents in reality systematically violate the traditional diversification assump-
tion when choosing among risky gambles. Indeed, seminal psychological and behavioral
economics research by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) (see also Simon (1955) and Simon
(1979)) suggests that the portfolio construction task may be too complex for decision mak-
ers to perform. Consequently, investors adopt various types of simplified diversification
paradigms in practice.
One of the most widely applied such simple rules of choice is the so-called naive diver-
sification heuristic. It stipulates that an economic agent allocates equal weights among
a given choice set, independent of the individual characteristics of the underlying choice
alternatives. In the context of portfolio construction, this rule is often referred to as the
equal-weighted or 1/n strategy. This naive diversification paradigm goes as far back as the
Talmud2 and has been coined as Talmudic diversification by Duchin and Levy (2009). It
is documented that even Harry Markowitz used the simple 1/n heuristic when he made
his own retirement investments. He justifies his choice on psychological grounds: “My
intention was to minimize my future regret. So I split my contributions fifty-fifty between
bonds and equities.” (Gigerenzer 2010)
1.1 Related principles
Naive diversification implies a preference of equality over inequality in the choice weights.
One of the earliest, closely related hypotheses concerning decisions under subjective un-
certainty is the principle of insufficient reason, also called the principle of indifference. It
is generally attributed to Bernoulli (1738) and invoked by Bayes (1763) in his development
1These difficulties are stemming from the instability of the optimization problem with respect to the
available data. As is the case with any economic model, the true parameters are unknown and need to be
estimated, hence resulting in uncertainty and estimation error. For a discussion of the problems arising
in implementing mean-variance optimal portfolios, see for example Hodges and Brealy (1978), Best and
Grauer (1991), Michaud (1998), and Litterman (2003).
2The relevant Talmudic passage states that “it is advisable for one that he should divide his money
in three parts, one of which he shall invest in real estate, one of which in business, and the third part to
remain always in his hands.”
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of the binomial theorem. The principle states that in situations where there is no logical
or empirical reason to favor any one of a set of mutually exclusive events or choices over
any other, one should assign them all equal probability. In Bayesian probability, this is
the simplest non-informative prior.
Outside the choice theoretic framework, the notion of preference of equality over in-
equality dominates several prominent problems in economic theory. Early in the twentieth
century, economists became interested in measuring inequality of incomes or wealth. More
specifically, it became desirable to determine how income or wealth distributions might
be compared in order to say that one distribution was more equal than another. The first
discussion of this kind was provided by Lorenz (1905). He suggested a graphical manner
in which to compare inequality in finite populations in terms of nested curves. If total
wealth is uniformly distributed, the so-called Lorenz curve is a straight line. With an
unequal distribution, the curves will always begin and end in the same points as with an
equal distribution, but they will be bent in the middle. The rule of interpretation, as he
puts it, is: as the bow is bent, concentration increases. Later, Dalton (1920) described
the closely related principle of transfers. Under the theoretical proposition of a positive
functional relationship between income and economic welfare, stating that economic wel-
fare increases at an exponentially decreasing rate with increased income, Dalton concludes
that maximum social welfare is achievable only when all incomes are equal. Following a
suggestion by Pigou (1912), he proposed the condition that a transfer of income from a
richer to a poorer person, so long as that transfer does not reverse the ranking of the two,
will result in greater equity. Such an operation, involving the shifting of wealth from one
individual to a relatively poorer individual, is known as the Pigou-Dalton transfer and has
also been labeled as a Robin Hood transfer. The seminal ideas of Lorenz (1905) and Dalton
(1920) will be referenced frequently throughout our development of naive diversification
preferences, as the mathematical framework upon which we rely coincides with theoretical
formalizations of the Lorenz curve and the Dalton transfer.
1.2 Experimental and empirical evidence of naive diversification
Academics and practitioners have long studied the occurrence of naive diversification,
along with its downside and potential benefits. Some of the first academic demonstrations
of naive diversification as a choice heuristic were made by Simonson (1990) in marketing in
the context of consumption decisions by individuals, and by Read and Loewenstein (1995)
in the context of experimental psychology. In the context of economic and financial decision
making, empirical evidence suggests behavior which is consistent with naive diversification.
For instance, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) turned to study whether the effect manifests itself
among investors making decisions in the context of defined contribution saving plans. Their
experimental evidence suggests that some people spread their contributions evenly across
the investment options irrespective of the particular mix of options. The authors point out
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that while naive diversification can produce a “reasonable portfolio”, it affects the resulting
asset allocation and can be costly. In particular, people might choose a portfolio that is not
on the efficient frontier, or they might pick the wrong point along the frontier. Moreover, it
does not assure sensible or coherent decision making. Subsequently, Huberman and Jiang
(2006) find that participants tend to invest in only a small number of the funds offered
to them, and that they tend to allocate their contributions evenly across the funds that
they use, with this tendency weakening with the number of funds used. More recently,
Baltussen and Post (2011) find strong evidence for what they coin as irrational behavior.
Their subjects follow a conditional naive diversification heuristic as they exclude the assets
with an unattractive marginal distribution and divide the available funds equally between
the remaining, attractive assets. This strategy is applied even if it leads to allocations that
are dominated in terms of first-order stochastic dominance – hence the term irrational.
Irrationality has been since then frequently used to describe naive diversification behavior.
In Fernandes (2013), the naive diversification bias of Benartzi and Thaler (2001) was
replicated across different samples using a within-participant manipulation of portfolio
options. It was found that the more investors use intuitive judgments, the more likely
they are to display the naive diversification bias.
In the context of portfolio construction, naive diversification has enjoyed a revival dur-
ing the last few years because of its simplicity on one hand and the empirical evidence
on the other hand suggesting superior performance compared to traditional diversifica-
tion schemes. In addition to the relative outperformance, the empirical stability of the
naive 1/n diversification rule has made it particularly attractive in practice, as — unlike
Markowitz’s risk minimization strategies — it does not rely on unknown correlation pa-
rameters that need to be estimated from data. Moreover, its outperformance has been
investigated and a range of reasons have been proposed for why naive diversification may
outperform other diversification paradigms. The most widely documented of these is the
so-called small-cap-effect within the universe of equities. This theory stipulates that stocks
with smaller market capitalization tend to ourperform larger stocks, and by construction,
naive diversification gives more exposure to smaller cap stocks compared to capitalization
weighting. Empirical support for the superior performance of equal weighted portfolios
relative to capitalization weighting include Lessard (1976), Roll (1981), Ohlson and Rosen-
berg (1982), Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Kora-
jczyk and Sadka (2004), Hamza, Kortas, L’Her, and Roberge (2007) and Pae and Sabbaghi
(2010). Furthermore, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007) show the strong performance
relative to optimized portfolios. Duchin and Levy (2009) provide a comparison of naive
and Markowitz diversification and show that an equally weighted portfolio may often be
substantially closer to the true mean variance optimality than an optimized portfolio.
On the other hand, Tu and Zhou (2011) propose a combination of naive and sophisti-
cated strategies, including Markowitz optimization, as a way to improve performance, and
conclude that the combined rules not only have a significant impact in improving the
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sophisticated strategies, but also outperform the naive rule in most scenarios.
1.3 Towards choice-theoretic foundations
The word naive inherently implies a lack of sophistication. Indeed, our overview of naive
diversification so far indicates that it is widely viewed as an anomaly linked to irrational
behavior and that it does not assure sensible or coherent decision making. In its essence,
the naive diversification paradigm is considered a simple and practical rule of thumb with
no economic foundation guaranteeing its optimality. Moreover, despite the large experi-
mental and empirical evidence of the presence and outperformance of naive diversification,
a formalization of this heuristic within a choice theoretic or economic modelling framework
does not seem to exist.
With the purpose of filling this gap, this paper provides mathematically and economi-
cally sound choice theoretic foundations for the naive approach to diversification of decision
makers and investors. To this end, we axiomatize naive diversification by framing it as a
choice theoretic preference for equality over inequality, which has a utility representation,
and derive its relationship to the classical diversification paradigm. The crux of our choice
theoretic aciomatization of the naive diversification heuristic lies in the idea that equality
is preferred over inequality, a concept that is simultaneously simple and complex, as put
by Sen (1973): “At one level, it is the simplest of all ideas and has moved people with an
immediate appeal hardly matched by any other concept. At another level, however, it is an
exceedingly complex notion which makes statements of inequality highly problematic, and
it has been, therefore, the subject of much research by philosophers, statisticians, political
theorists, sociologists and economists.” We complement this line of research from a deci-
sion theoretic perspective by using the mathematical concept of majorization3 to describe
a preference relation which exhibits preference for naive diversification.
The goal of our choice-theoretic approach is threefold: First, by developing an ax-
iomatic system for what is considered to be an “irrational” choice paradigm such as naive
diversification, we can justify that it is in fact to some degree “rational”, in the sense that
the axiomatization precisely captures widely observed regularities of behavior. Second,
this axiomatization enables us to gain some insights into the nature of the preferences and
the utility of the naive diversifier that were previously unknown. In particular, by relat-
ing it to other known axiomatized behavioral paradigms, we will show that preferences
for naive diversification are equivalent to convex preferences that additionally exhibit an
indifference among the choice alternatives, which is formalized via a notion of permuta-
tion invariant preferences. This essentially implies that naive diversifiers simply have a
different, yet consistent, set of preferences and utility functions that are closely related to,
3Historically, majorization has been used to describe inequality orderings in the economic context
of inequality of income, as developed by both Lorenz (1905) and Dalton (1920). We refer the reader
to Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2011) for a comprehensive self-contained account of the theory and
applications of majorization.
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rather than contradicting, those of the traditional concave utility maximizers. Finally, one
may use the axioms underlying naive diversification to test the behavioral drivers of this
choice heuristic in reality. For example, one of our axioms, that of permutation invariance,
implies that the given alternatives are considered in some way symmetric or equivalent
by the naive decision maker. This is an axiom that can be directly tested in, say, an
experimental setting by relating it to Laplace’s principle of indifference and varying the
amount of information available for each of the choice alternatives. We will briefly revisit
this last point in Section 6.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the choice
theoretic framework and provides the necessary background on majorization and doubly
stochastic matrices, both of which are fundamental concepts in our development. Section
3 presents an axiomatic formalization of naive diversification preferences and derive its re-
lationship to the traditional (convex) diversification axiom. We then show that the notion
of permutation invariance lies at the core of our definition and that a preference relation
exhibits preference for naive diversification if and only if it is convex and permutation
invariant. The corresponding utility representation in terms of Schur-concave functions is
discussed in Section 4. We show that Schur-concavity captures the idea of being inequal-
ity averse on top of being risk averse and discuss measures of inequality, which indicate
how far from optimality a given choice allocation is and which allow for a quantitative
comparison of two non-equal allocations in terms of their distance. Section 5 characterizes
the transformations which rebalance a choice allocation into another more equal alloca-
tion, in terms of the implied turnover and the induced transaction cost. In particular, we
show that the least possible turnover is attained by applying the Pigou-Dalton transfer
finitely many times. Section 6 concludes with a summary of our contributions and a brief
discussion of possible generalizations of our development.
2 Theoretical setup
2.1 Preference relation
We consider a decision maker who chooses from the vector space X = L∞(Ω,F ,P) of
essentially bounded real-valued random variables on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), where
Ω is the set of states of nature, F is a σ-algebra of events, and P is a σ-additive probability
measure on (Ω,F).4
The decision maker is assumed to be able to form compound choices represented by
the state-wise convex combination αx + (1 − α) y for x, y ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1], defined by
αx(ω) + (1 − α) y(ω) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω. The space X is endowed with the order
4In this paper, we adopt the classical setup for risk assessment used in mathematical finance. However,
almost all results presented in this paper also hold when alternative assumptions on X are made, e.g., X
could be the space of probability distributions on a set of prizes, as often assumed in classical decision
theory models.
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x ≥ y ⇔ x(ω) ≥ y(ω) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω. For n ≥ 2, α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn and
(x1, . . . , xn)
′ ∈ X n, we will often denote the convex combination ∑ni=1 αixi by the dot
product α · x.5
A weak preference relation on X is a binary relation % satisfying:
(i) Completeness : For all x, y ∈ X , x % y ∨ y % x.
(ii) Transitivity : For all x, y, z ∈ X , x % y ∧ y % z ⇒ x % z.
Every weak preference relation % on X induces an indifference relation ∼ on X defined
by x ∼ y ⇔ (x % y) ∧ (y % x). The corresponding strict preference relation  on X
is defined by x  y ⇔ x % y ∧ ¬(x ∼ y). A numerical or utility representation of the
preference relation % is a real-valued function u : X → R for which x % y if and only if
u(x) ≥ u(y).
For x ∈ X , Fx denotes the cumulative distribution function of x, defined by Fx(c) =
P [x ≤ c] for c ∈ R, and e(x) is the expected value of x, that is, e(x) = ∫ x dFx(x). For
c ∈ R, δc denotes the degenerated random variable with δc(ω) = c for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
The certainty equivalent of x ∈ X is the value c(x) ∈ R such that x ∼ δc(x), i.e., c(x)
is the certain value which the decision maker views as equally desirable as a choice x
with uncertain outcome. The risk premium pi(x) of x ∈ X is the amount by which the
expected value of a choice x ∈ X must exceed the value of the guaranteed outcome in
order to make the uncertain and certain choices equally attractive. Formally, it is defined
as pi(x) = e(x)− c(x).
Emulating the majority of frameworks of economic theory, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that decision makers prefer more to less. In particular, in view of the monetary
interpretation of the space X , a natural assumption on the preference relation % is mono-
tonicity.
(iii) Monotonicity : For all x, y ∈ X , x ≥ y =⇒ x % y.
Monotonicity of preferences is equivalent to having an increasing utility function u. Indeed,
for x ≥ y, we have x % y and thus u(x) ≥ u(y). Monotonicity of the utility function simply
implies that an agent believes that “more is better”; a larger outcome never yields lower
utility, and for risky bets the agent would prefer a bet which is first-order stochastically
dominant over an alternative bet.
Finally, continuity of preferences is assumed for technical reasons, as it can be used
as a sufficient condition for showing that preferences on infinite sets can have utility
representations. It intuitively states that if x  y, then small deviations from x or from y
will not reverse the ordering.
5For notational convenience, we write elements in Rn as row vectors and elements in Xn as column
(random) vectors.
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(iv) Continuity : For every x  y, there exist neighborhoods Bx, By ⊆ X around x and
y, respectively, such that for every x′ ∈ Bx and y′ ∈ By, x′  y′.
Throughout this article, unless otherwise stated, we assume that preferences are both
monotonic and continuous. Debreu’s theorem (Debreu 1964) states that there exists a
continuous monotonic utility representation u of a monotonic and continuous preference
relation %.
2.2 Choice weights and majorization
We use the theory of majorization from linear algebra to measure the variability of weights
when diversifying across a set of n possible choices. Majorization, which was formally
introduced by Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1934), captures the idea that the components
of a weight vector α ∈ Rn are less spread out or more nearly equal than the components
of a vector β ∈ Rn. For any α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn, let
α(1) ≥ · · · ≥ α(n)
denote the components of α in decreasing order, and let
α↓ = (α(1), . . . , α(n))
denote the decreasing rearrangement of α. The weight vector with i-th component equal to
1 and all other components equal to 0 is denoted by ei, and the vector with all components
equal to 1 is denoted by e. We restrict our attention to non-negative weights which sum
to one, that is, α ∈ Sn = {v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn+ |∑ni=1 vi = 1}. This means that the
decision maker is assumed to use his full capital and is not taking “inverse” positions such
as shorting in financial economics. Moreover, we will sometimes refers to the set
Sn↓ =
{
v↓ = (v(1), . . . , v(n)) ∈ Rn+ |
n∑
i=1
v(i) = 1
}
.
We now define the notion of majorization:
Definition 1 (Majorization). For α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn and β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Rn, β is
said to (weakly) majorize α (or, equivalently, α is majorized by β), denoted by β ≥m α,
if
n∑
i=1
αi =
n∑
i=1
βi
and for all k = 1, . . . , n− 1,
k∑
i=1
α(i) ≤
k∑
i=1
β(i) .
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Majorization is a preorder on the weight vectors in Sn and a partial order on Sn↓ .
It is trivial but important to note that all vectors in Sn↓ majorize the uniform vector
un = (
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
), since the uniform vector is the vector with minimal differences between
its components.
A key mathematical result in the study of majorization and inequality measurement
is a theorem due to Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1929). It roughly states that a vector
α is majorized by a vector β if and only if α is an averaging of β. This “averaging”
operation is formalized via doubly stochastic matrices.6 A square matrix P is said to be
stochastic if its elements are all non-negative and all rows sum to one. If, in addition to
being stochastic, all columns sum to one, the matrix is said to be doubly stochastic. A
formal definition follows.
Definition 2 (Doubly stochastic matrix). An n×n matrix P = (pij) is doubly stochastic
if pij ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , n, eP = e and Pe′ = e′. We denote by Dn the set of n × n
doubly stochastic matrices.
Theorem 1 (Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1929)). For α,β ∈ Rn, α is majorized by β
if and only if α = βP for some doubly stochastic matrix P .7
An obvious example of a doubly stochastic matrix is the n× n matrix in which every
entry is 1/n, which we shall denote by Pn. Other simple examples are given by the
n × n identity matrix In and by permutation matrices: a square matrix Π is said to
be a permutation matrix if each row and column has a single unit entry with all other
entries being zero. There are n! such matrices of size n × n each of which is obtained by
interchanging rows or columns of the identity matrix. The set Dn of doubly stochastic
matrices is convex and permutation matrices constitute its extreme points.
Use of a special type of doubly stochastic matrix, the so-called T -transform, will be
made in this paper.
Definition 3 (T-transform). A (elementary) T -transform is a matrix that has the form
T = λI + (1 − λ)Π, where λ ∈ [0, 1] and Π is a permutation matrix that interchanges
exactly two coordinates. For α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, αT thus has the form
αT = (α1, . . . , αj−1, λαj + (1− λ)αk, αj+1, . . . , αk−1, λαk + (1− λ)αj, αk+1, . . . , αn) ,
where we assume that the j-th and k-th coordinates of α are averaged.
The importance of T -transforms can be seen from the following result, which is essential
in the proof of Theorem 1 and which we shall utilize in some of the proofs of this article.
Proposition 1 (Muirhead (1903); Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1934)). If α ∈ Rn is
majorized by β ∈ Rn, then α can be derived from β by successive applications of a finite
number of T -transforms.
6A note on terminology: the term “stochastic matrix” goes back to the large role that they play
in the theory of discrete Markov chains. Doubly stochastic matrices are also sometimes called “Schur
transformations” or “bistochastic”.
7We refer the reader to Schmeidler (1979) for several economic interpretations of Theorem 1, including
decisions under uncertainty and welfare economics.
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3 Naive diversification preferences
3.1 Classical diversification
An economic agent who chooses to diversify is traditionally understood to prefer variety
over similarity. Axiomatically, preference for diversification is formalized as follows; see
Dekel (1989).
Definition 4 (Preference for diversification). A preference relation % exhibits preference
for diversification if for any x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and α1, . . . , αn ∈ [0, 1] for which
∑n
i=1 αi = 1,
x1 ∼ · · · ∼ xn ⇒
n∑
i=1
αixi % xj for all j = 1, . . . , n.
This definition states that an individual will want to diversify among a collection of
choices all of which are ranked equivalently. The most common example of such diversi-
fication is within the universe of asset markets, where an investor faces a choice amongst
risky assets.
The related notion of convexity of preferences inherently relates to the classic ideal of
diversification, as introduced by Bernoulli (1738). By combining two choices, the decision
maker is ensured under convexity that he is never “worse off” than the least preferred of
these two choices.
Definition 5 (Convex preferences). A preference relation % on X is convex if for all
x, y ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1),
x % y ⇒ αx+ (1− α) y % y.
Indeed, a monotonic and continuous preference relation is convex if and only if it
exhibits preference for diversification, allowing us to use both axioms interchangeably.
Moreover, it is well-known that a preference relation that is represented by a concave
utility function is convex, and that a preference relation is convex if and only if its utility
representation is quasi-concave. Variations on this classical definition of diversification
exist in the literature (see, for example, Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002) and Chateauneuf
and Lakhnati (2007)). We refer to De Giorgi and Mahmoud (2016) for a recent analysis
of the classical definitions of diversification in the theory of choice.
3.2 Naive diversification
We present an axiomatic formalization of the notion of naive diversification in terms of
preference of equal decision weights over unequal decision weights.
Definition 6 (Preference for naive diversification). A preference relation % exhibits pref-
erence for naive diversification if for n ∈ N, and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈
Sn it follows that:
α ≤m β ⇒
n∑
i=1
αixi %
n∑
i=1
βixi for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ X .
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A preference relation % exhibits preference for weak naive diversification if for n ∈ N
and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn it follows that:
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi %
n∑
i=1
αixi for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ X .
This definition states that a preference relation % exhibits preference for naive diver-
sification when a weight vector is always preferred to any alternative weight vector that
majorizes it, i.e., it is more unequal; see Ibragimov (2009). We now derive some initial
properties of a preference relation % that exhibits preference for naive diversification:
(1) On naive versus weak naive diversification. Definition 6 implies that 1
n
∑n
i=1 xi %∑n
i=1 αixi for any α ∈ Sn, because any α ∈ Sn majorizes the equal-weighted decision vec-
tor un =
(
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
)
. It follows that the equal-weighted decision vector un is the most
preferred choice allocation when % exhibits naive diversification preferences. This means
that preference for naive diversification implies preference for weak naive diversification.
However, the converse does not necessarily hold.
(2) On naive diversification and number of alternatives. In general, we have
un · x %
(
1
n− 1 , . . . ,
1
n− 1 , 0
)
· x % · · · %
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, . . . , 0
)
· x % e1 · x ,
for all n ∈ N. This ordering entails the informal diversification paradigm that more is
better, as analyzed by Elton and Gruber (1977), since an equal weighted allocation to n
choices is more preferred to an equal weighted allocation to m choices if and only if n ≥ m.
(3) On indifference under naive diversification. Note that choice weights under
naive diversification preferences are equivalent whenever their ordered vectors coincide.
Moreover, whenever a collection of choices are pairwise equally ranked, a convex com-
bination of each of these must be equally ranked. The following formalization of these
observations is hence an immediate consequence of Definition 6.
Lemma 1. Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Sn and x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn ∈
X such that xi ∼ yi for i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose that % exhibits preference for naive diversi-
fication. Then
(i)
∑n
i=1 αixi ∼
∑n
i=1 βixi if and only if
∑k
i=1 α(i) =
∑k
i=1 β(i) for all k = 1, . . . , n;
(ii)
∑n
i=1 αixi ∼
∑n
i=1 αiyi.
(4) On naive diversification and convex preferences. An agent whose preferences
are convex chooses to diversify by taking a convex combination over individual choices
without specifying a preference ordering over choice weights. So the classical notion of
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diversification does not necessarily imply preferences for naive diversification. The con-
verse holds however: suppose that % exhibits preferences for naive diversification and
let x1, . . . , xn ∈ X with x1 ∼ · · · ∼ xn. Then, for α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, we have∑n
i=1 αixi % xj for all j = 1, . . . , n, since the components of the choice vector α are more
nearly equal than those of ej, i.e., any α ∈ Sn is majorized by ej. This proves the following
result.
Proposition 2. Naive diversification preferences are convex, or, equivalently, exhibit pref-
erences for diversification.
3.3 Permutation invariant preferences
The notion of permutation invariance lies at the core of the definition of naive diversifi-
cation. Permutation invariance captures the idea that the underlying characteristics of
the individual choices are irrelevant in the decision making process. In other words, the
economic agent is indifferent towards a permutation of the components of choice vectors.
We formalize such permutation invariant preferences through permutation matrices. For
a permutation matrix Π and choice vector α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, we shall write αΠ for
the vector whose components have been shuffled using Π and whose i-th component we
denote by (αΠ)i. When ordering the components of αΠ in decreasing order, we denote
its i-th ordered component by (αΠ)(i).
Definition 7 (Permutation invariant preferences). A preference relation % on X is per-
mutation invariant if for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn,
α · x ∼ (αΠ) · x ,
where Π is a permutation matrix and x = (x1, . . . , xn).
The following lemma shows that naive diversification preferences are permutation in-
variant.
Lemma 2. Naive diversification preferences are permutation invariant.
Proof. For all α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, we have α↓ = (αΠ)↓. Therefore,
∑k
i=1 α(i) =∑k
i=1(αΠ)(i) for all k = 1, . . . , n. By Lemma 1, this implies that α · x ∼ (αΠ) · x.
Recall that Lemma 1 characterizes indifference between choice weights in terms of
equality of the corresponding ordered vectors. An immediate consequence is the follow-
ing Corollary, which states that an indifference between two choice allocations does not
necessarily correspond to the choice vectors being equal, but that they differ in terms of
permutation.
Corollary 1. Let α,β ∈ Sn and x1, . . . , xn ∈ X . If % exhibits preference for naive
diversification, then α = βΠ if and only if
∑n
i=1 αixi ∼
∑n
i=1 βixi.
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The significance of permutation invariance manifests itself in its implication for classical
diversification. Indeed, imposing permutation invariance on convex preferences yields
preferences for naive diversification (Proposition 4). We start by showing the weaker
result.
Proposition 3. A preference relation % that is permutation invariant and convex exhibits
preference for weak naive diversification.
Proof. Because any α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn majorizes the vector un, then, according to
Proposition 1, un can be derived from α by successive applications of a finite number of
T -transforms, i.e.,
un = αT1T2 · · ·Tk
where T1, T2, · · ·Tk are T -transforms. For x1, . . . , xn ∈ X , we have:
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi = un · x = (αT1 · · ·Tk) · x.
We prove that (αT1 · · ·Tk) ·x % α ·x by mathematical induction. First of all, we show
that (αT ) · x % α · x when T is T -transform and % is permutation invariant and convex.
Indeed,
(αT ) · x = [α(λ I + (1− λ)Q)] · x = λα · x+ (1− α) (αQ) · x
where Q is a permutation matrix. Because % is permutation invariant, then (αQ) · x ∼
α · x. Finally, because % is convex, then
λα · x+ (1− λ) (αQ) · x % α · x.
It follow that
(αT ) · x % α · x.
Now suppose that (αT1 · · ·Tk−1) · x % α · x. Let α˜ = αT1 · · ·Tk−1. It follows that:
(αT1 · · ·Tk) · x = (α˜Tk) · x % α˜ · x = (αT1 · · ·Tk−1) · x % α · x.
Therefore,
(αT1 · · ·Tk) · x % α · x.
This proves the statement of the proposition.
We recall that T -transforms (Definition 3) are averaging operators between two com-
ponents of the original weight vector. This averaging operator is always weakly preferred
under permutation invariant and convex preferences. The proof of Proposition 3 shows
that repeated averaging of two components of a weight vector reaches its limit at the
equal-weighted decision vector un. Therefore, Proposition 3 can be viewed as a corollary
to Muirhead’s result (Proposition 1).
Another seminal result tangentially related to Proposition 3 appeared in Samuelson
(1967), where the first formal proof of the following, at the time seemingly well-understood,
diversification paradigm is given: “putting a fixed total of wealth equally into independently,
identically distributed investments will leave the mean gain unchanged and will minimize
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the variance.” One may hence think of the conditions of having non-negative, independent
and identically distributed random variables in Theorem 1 of Samuelson (1967) being re-
placed by the permutation invariance condition in Proposition 3 to yield an equal weighted
allocation as optimal.8
We next derive the stronger statement, which gives naive diversification under permu-
tation invariance and convexity.
Proposition 4. A preference relation % that is permutation invariant and convex exhibits
preference for naive diversification.
Proof. Suppose that % is permutation invariant and convex. We have to show that α ·
x%β · x for all x′ ∈ X when β ≥m α. If β ≥m α, then α can be derived from β by
successive applications of a finite number of T -transforms. By applying the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 3, we have α · x % β · x. Therefore, % exhibits preference
for naive diversification.
Combining Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 with Proposition 4 yields the following equiv-
alence of preferences.
Theorem 2. A monotonic and continuous preference relation % exhibits preference for
naive diversification if and only if it is convex and permutation invariant.
4 Representation
4.1 Utility representation
We consider a preference relation % that exhibits preference for naive diversification and
also possesses a utility representation u, i.e., x % y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y). In this
section we study the implications of preference for naive diversification (or, equivalently,
permutation invariance and convexity) on the utility function u. Without loss of gener-
ality we restrict our analysis to the case where diversification is among at most n choice
alternatives. Let us fix x = (x1, . . . , xn)
′ ∈ X n and for α ∈ Sn define
φx(α) = u(α · x).
Because under naive diversification α · x % β · x when β ≥m α, then
φx(α) = u(α · x) ≥ u(β · x) = φx(β)
when β ≥m α. Therefore, φx is Schur-concave.9 The utility function u : X → R, on
the other hand, is generally not Schur-concave on X = L∞(Ω,F ,P). Indeed, u is Schur-
concave on X = L∞(Ω,F ,P) when it is consistent with the convex order on L∞(Ω,F ,P);
8See Hadar and Russell (1969), Hadar and Russell (1971), Tesfatsion (1976) and Li and Wong (1999)
for generalizations of Samuelson’s classical result.
9A function f : Rn → R is said to be Schur-concave when x is majorized by y implies f(x) ≥ f(y).
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see Dana (2005). Proposition 2.1 in Dana (2005) shows that u is monotone and Schur-
concave on L∞(Ω,F ,P) if and only if it is consistent with second-order stochastic dom-
inance. However, a preference relation that exhibits preference for naive diversification
is monotone but generally not consistent with second-order stochastic dominance, which
implies that u is generally not Schur-concave on X .
We point out that in general Schur-concave functions are neither concave nor quasi-
concave. However, in our case, because the preference relation is convex (as naive diversi-
fication implies permutation invariance and convexity), both u and φx are quasi-concave.
A seminal result known as the Schur-Ostrowski criterion (due to Schur (1923) and Os-
trowski (1952)) is that when φx is differentiable then it is Schur-concave if and only if it
is symmetric (i.e., φx(α) = φx(αQ) for any permutation Q) and
(αi − αj)
(
∂φx(α)
∂αi
− ∂φx(α)
∂αj
)
≤ 0
for all i 6= j. This implies that ∂φx
∂αi
(α) ≤ ∂φx(α)
∂αj
when αi > αj. In other words, util-
ity gained from naive diversification is more sensitive to changes in smaller component
weights. Increasing smaller choice components (those that are ≤ 1
n
) implies moving closer
to equality and hence leads to higher utility, whereas an increase in the relatively larger
components (those that are already ≥ 1
n
) decreases utility as the resulting choice vector is
further away from the equal weighted vector.
Well-known concrete examples of functions that could represent naive diversification
preferences are the standard deviation and entropy functions, which we illustrate for the
sake of simplicity on Sn:
Example 1. (i) The standard deviation σ : Sn → R defined by
σ(λ1, . . . , λ1) =
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(λi − 1
n
)2
] 1
2
is Schur-convex, which means that its negative −σ is Schur-concave. Dalton (1920)
was the first to study standard deviation as a measure of inequality of incomes.
(ii) The Shannon information entropy H : Sn → R defined by
H(λ1, . . . , λn) = −
n∑
i=1
λi log λi
represents naive diversification preferences and is commonly used as a measure of
inequality in a population.10
10The term entropy in general implies disorder, unpredictability or uncertainty. In information theory,
entropy is used to measure uncertainty of outcomes, and maximum uncertainty is reached when all out-
comes are equally probable and hence difficult to predict. Entropy is also commonly used to measure
diversity in ecological, biological and information sciences.
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As shown in Section 3, naive diversifiers are inequality averse on top of being risk averse.
Schur-concavity (and Schur-convexity) have historically been the key notions in inequality
theory. They are equivalent to requiring monotonicity with respect to the Lorenz order
(Lorenz 1905) and the Dalton principle of transfers (Dalton 1920). Our work supports
these findings by showing that Schur-concavity captures the notion of being inequality
averse in the context of choice under uncertainty, and its monotonicity property extends
to orders that exhibit preference for naive diversification.
Moreover, Schur (1923) and Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1929) showed that a vector
α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn is closer to equality than β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Sn if and only
if
∑n
i=1 g(αi) ≥
∑n
i=1 g(βi) for all continuous concave functions g : [0, 1] → R. This
condition can be interpreted as a ranking for aggregating the utility of individual choices
— if an agent is a concave risk averse utility maximizer, the aggregate total utility of n
individual choices must be higher for an allocation with less variation, when the agent is
inequality averse on top of being risk averse.11
4.2 Measuring naive diversification.
We briefly discuss properties that measures of the degree of Schur-concave optimality
should satisfy. An evaluation of the optimality of a given choice allocation of a naive di-
versifier essentially reduces to a measure of inequality of the decision weights of his choice.
Measures of inequality arise in various disciplines within economic theory, particularly
within the context of wealth and income.12 Most of these indices have been developed
primarily based on foundations of the concept of social welfare, and hence may not nec-
essarily be applicable to our setting. Since a measure of inequality strongly depends on
the context, we provide an axiomatization that is consistent with our definition of pref-
erence for naive diversification, which has a precise mathematical formulation in terms of
majorization and Schur-concave functions. Many indices are qualitative in nature focused
on ranking with no indication of a quantification of the comparison. We do not only seek
a qualitative ranking of choice allocations, but we aim to quantify the distance between
two weight allocations. The resulting measure hence indicates how far from optimality a
given choice allocation is and allows for comparison of two non-equal choice allocations in
terms of their distance.
Let % be a preference relation on X exhibiting preferences for naive diversification. To
derive the qualitative and quantitative properties that are consistent with naive diversi-
fication, we fix the optimal choice allocation un = (
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
) for a given n and look at
comparisons with respect to this vector. The following are the minimal requirements that
11This is a well-known condition in social choice theory, where it corresponds to the social welfare
ranking: g stands for the individual utility function of every individual xi in a population of size n, and∑n
i=1 g(xi) is the overall social welfare utility of the population.
12There is a vast literature on diversity and inequality indices in economics — see classical discussions
and surveys by Sen (1973), Szal and Robinson (1977), Dalton (1920), Atkinson (1970), Blackorby and
Donaldson (1978), and Kra¨mer (1998).
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a measure µn : X → R of naive diversification should satisfy:
(A1) Positivity: For all x ∈ X , µn(x) ≥ 0.
(A2) Normality: For all x ∈ X , µn(x) = 0 if and only if x ∼ un · x for some x =
(x1, . . . , xn).
(A3) Boundedness: For all x ∈ X , µn(x) <∞.
(A4) Representation: For all x, y ∈ X , x % y implies µn(x) ≥ µn(y).
(A5) Permutation invariance: Forα = (α1, . . . , αn),β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Sn and x1, . . . , xn ∈
X , if ∑ni=1 αixi % ∑ni=1 βixi and α 6= Πβ for any permutation matrix Π, then
µn(
∑n
i=1 αixi) > µn(
∑n
i=1 βixi).
Axioms A1, A2, and A3 essentially ensure that the function µn is a well-behaved prob-
ability metric (Rachev, Stoyanov, and Fabozzi 2011) and hence an analytically sound mea-
sure of the distance between two random quantities. Axiom A4 implies Schur-concavity
and thus that the qualitative ranking is preserved. By introducing invariance under per-
mutation (Axiom A5), we require strict Schur-concavity. This distinguishes equivalence,
and hence a zero distance from equality, from a strict preference ordering of choice weights,
which should give a strictly positive distance.
Example 2. The following well-known classes of measures from statistics, economics and
asset management satisfy the above axioms and are hence in particular Schur-concave
(Axiom A4) and invariant under permutation (Axiom A5):
(i) Statistical dispersion measures. Many familiar measures of dispersion, or their nega-
tion, satisfy the above axioms. Examples include the variance (as opposed to the
standard deviation from Example 1); its normalized version, which is known as the
coefficient of variation; and the entropy function from Example 1. Other closely re-
lated functions, such as g(
∑n
i=1 αixi) = [
1
n
∑n
i=1(logαi)
2]1/2, are sometimes used to
measure inequality, but do not satisfy these two axioms, however.
(ii) Economic inequality indices. The Lorenz curve has suggested several indices aimed
to measure economic equality, and they can be shown to satisfy Axioms A4 and A5.
One of the most widely used such measure is the Gini coefficient (Gini 1921), or the
related Gini mean difference, defined by G(
∑n
i=1 αixi) =
1
n2
∑
j
∑
k |αj − αk|. Other
examples are given by functions that are sums of strictly concave utilities, such as
Dalton’s measure (Dalton 1920) and Atkinson’s measure (Atkinson 1970).
(iii) Diversification indices. Many measures of portfolio concentration in finance are re-
ferred to as diversification indices, whereas they are in fact measures of naive di-
versification. One of the most standard such measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (Hirschman 1964): H(
∑n
i=1 αixi) = (
∑n
i=1 α
2
i −1/n)/(1−1/n). This measure
is equivalent to the Simpson diversity index (Simspon 1949), which is simply a sum
of squares of the choice weights.
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5 Rebalancing to equality
Based on Theorem 1 of Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1929), a doubly stochastic matrix
can be thought of as an operation between two weight allocations leading towards greater
equality in the weight vector. With this in mind, we define a rebalancing transform to
be a doubly stochastic matrix. Clearly, rebalancing in this context cannot yield a less
diversified allocation. In other words, applying a rebalancing transform to a vector of
decision weights is equivalent to averaging the decision weights.
In this Section, we characterize such transforms which start with a suboptimal weight
allocation
∑n
i=1 αixi and produce equality
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi in terms of their implied turnover
in practice. Our analysis is focused on the asset allocation problem, where rebalancing
is understood in terms of buying and selling positions. However, this discussion can be
generalized to characterize transforms in the context of reallocation of wealth, such as
Dalton’s principle of transfers.
5.1 Rebalancing polytopes
Starting from an allocationα ∈ Sn, there are, in general, more than one possible transforms
that rebalance α to un or, more generally, to an allocation β ∈ Sn that is closer to equality.
Given two weight allocations α,β ∈ Sn with α majorized by β, the set
Ωα≤mβ = {P ∈ Dn | α = βP}
is referred to as the rebalancing polytope of the order α ≤m β.13 The set Ωα≤mβ is
nonempty, compact and convex. In the case that the components of β are simply a
rearrangement of the components of α, then Ωα≤mβ contains one unique permutation
matrix. In general, however, Ωα≤mβ contains more than one element.
Now, for λ ∈ Sn, we have un ≤m λ, and so our focus henceforth is the set
Ωn,λ := Ωun≤mλ = {P ∈ Dn | un = λP} .
It contains all rebalancing transformations that lead to an equal allocation. In particular,
it includes the matrix Pn with all entries equal to 1/n.
Example 3. Let n = 3, so u3 = (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), and let λ = (1
2
, 1
3
, 1
6
). Denote the entries
of a 3-dimensional matrix P by pij, for i, j = 1, 2, 3. Then, since for all j = 1, 2, 3,∑3
i=1 λipij =
1
3
and because the columns of P add to 1, we have 1
2
p11 +
1
3
p21 +
1
6
p31 =
1
3
and 1
2
p12 +
1
3
p22 +
1
6
p32 =
1
3
. Letting p12 = u and p21 = v, rebalancing transforms P =
P (u, v) ∈ Ωn,λ take the form
P (u, v) =

1
2
− 1
2
v u 1
2
+ 1
2
v − u
v 1− 2u 2u− v
1
2
− 1
2
v u 1
2
+ 1
2
v − u
 .
13Within the linear algebra literature, this set is referred to as the “majorization polytope”. As pointed
out by Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2011), very little is known about this polytope.
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Being a doubly stochastic matrix, the entries of P lie within [0, 1], and so the feasible
region lies in the first quadrant with respect to the variables u and v. For example, for
u = v = 0, we have
P (0, 0) =

1
2
0 1
2
0 1 0
1
2
0 1
2
 .
Note that for u = v = 1
3
, we obtain P (1
3
, 1
3
) = P3.
5.2 Rebalancing turnover
As in Example 3, we are interested in rebalancing a weight allocation towards equality in
practice. However, it is not clear how or why one would choose one transform in a given
polytope Ωn,λ over another. We provide a precise distinction in terms of turnover. In the
context of asset allocation, the particular rebalancing transform applied to rebalance one
weight allocation to another has an interpretation in terms of the fraction of assets bought
and sold and, consequently, in terms of the implied transaction costs.
Definition 8 (Turnover). For λ ∈ Sn, the turnover vector τ (λ) corresponding to rebal-
ancing λ to equality un is given by τ (λ) = λ − un, and the resulting turnover τ(λ) is
defined by τ(λ) = 1
2
∑n
i=1 |τi|, where τi are the components of the turnover vector τ (λ).
The turnover is intuitively equal to the portion of the total decision weights that
would have to be redistributed by taking from weights exceeding 1/n and assigning these
portions to weights that are less than 1/n. The turnover hence always lies between 0 and
1. Graphically, it can be represented as the longest vertical distance between the Lorenz
curve associated with a choice vector, and the diagonal line representing perfect equality.
Note the similarities between Definition 8 and the Hoover Index (Hoover 1936), a measure
of income metrics which is also known as the Robin Hood Index, as uniformity is achieved
in a population by taking from the richer half and giving to the poorer half.
Lemma 3. Let λ ∈ Sn and Ωn,λ = {P ∈ Dn | un = λP}. Then for all P ∈ Ωn,λ,
λ(In − P ) = τ (λ) .
Proof. The equation follows by definition, as λ(In − P ) = λ− λP = λ− un = τ (λ).
Example 4. The turnover resulting from transforming λ = (1
2
, 1
3
, 1
6
) of Example 3 to
equality u3 is equal to 1/6, which means that about 16.67% of a given portfolio’s assets
would theoretically have to be sold and bought to obtain an equal allocation.
Based on Definition 8, every transformation P ∈ Ωn,λ applied to λ theoretically yields
the same turnover. However, there is a subtle difference. Consider once again Example 3,
where one could apply P (0, 0) and P3 to rebalance the allocation λ = (
1
2
, 1
3
, 1
6
) to equality.
Note that the second entry of λ can remain as is, and one needs only to average its first
and third entries to obtain equality. This is precisely the transformation P (0, 0): the
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matrix entry p22 = 1 guarantees that λ2 = 1/3 remains as is, whereas the remaining
non-zero matrix entries average out the first and third entries of λ. On the other hand,
the transformation P3 takes the average of each of the three entries of λ. In practice,
this transformation would imply that the actual turnover is higher than the theoretical
turnover of 1/6. This is because more assets are bought or sold than is theoretically needed
to obtain equality. In our simple example of 3 possible choices, choosing a transformation
that minimizes turnover is straightforward. However, for larger collections, the choice of
the optimal rebalancing transformation may not be obvious.
We refer to the actual turnover induced in practice as the practical turnover.
Definition 9 (Practical turnover). Let λ ∈ Sn. For P ∈ Ωn,λ, the practical turnover is
given by τ˜P (λ) = τ(λ) ‖P − In‖, where ‖·‖ is the Frobenius norm taken up-to-permutation.14
The practical turnover is thus determined in terms of the distance of the corresponding
rebalancing transform from the identity transform (up-to-permutation). The idea is that
the closer one is to the identity transform, the smaller the changes that are applied to the
entries of the choice vector.
Proposition 5. Let λ 6= un ∈ Sn. For P ∈ Ωn,λ = {P ∈ Dn | un = λP}, denote by
τ˜(λ) = {τ˜P (λ) | P ∈ Ωn,λ} the set of all possible practical turnovers. Then
inf (τ˜(λ)) = τ(λ) .
In other words, the smallest possible practical turnover is the theoretical turnover.
Proof. We will show that ‖P − In‖ ≥ 1 for all P ∈ Ωn,λ. Note that we obtain the smallest
possible norm if all rows of P and In coincide up to permutation, except for two rows, say
i and j. In other words, all entries of λ and un coincide (up to permutation) apart from
the i-th and j-th entries that need to be averaged out to give 1/n each. Because P is a
doubly stochastic matrix, the entries of both rows i and j must be some a ∈ (0, 1) and
1−a. Consequently, ‖P − In‖ =
√
2a2 + 2(1− a)2 and its minimum is reached at a = 1/2,
implying that the smallest possible norm is equal to ‖P − In‖ =
√
4(1/2)2 = 1.
5.3 Minimal turnover via T-transforms
To characterize the rebalancing transform that would yield the theoretical turnover, and
thus by Proposition 5 the smallest possible practical turnover, we use the notion of T -
transform (Definition 3). Recall that in the economic context of equalizing wealth or
income, T -transforms are also known as Dalton or Robin Hood transfers and are interpreted
as the operation of shifting income or wealth from one individual to a relatively poorer
individual.
The following observation follows directly from the proof of Proposition 5.
Corollary 2. Suppose one can transform λ ∈ Sn to equality un directly through a single
T -transform, i.e. T ∈ Ωn,λ. Then ‖T − In‖ = 1.
14For a m× n matrix A = (aij), the Frobenious norm is defined as ‖A‖ =
√∑m
i=1
∑′
j=1 n|aij |2.
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Also recall that according to Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1934) (Proposition 1), if
a vector α ∈ Sn is majorized by another vector β ∈ Sn, then α can be derived from β by
successive applications of at most n− 1 such T -transforms. Therefore, every rebalancing
polytope Ωn,λ contains (not necessarily unique) products of T -transforms. In Example
3, P (0, 0) is itself a T -transform. Such successive applications of T -transforms do indeed
produce the least possible turnover, that is the theoretical turnover. The following is an
immediate consequence of the proof of Proposition 5 and the proof of Lemma 2, p.47 of
Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1934).
Proposition 6. Let λ 6= un ∈ Sn. Then
inf (τ˜(λ)) = τ˜Q(λ) ,
where Q ∈ Ωn,λ is a product of at most n− 1 T -transforms.
Corollary 3. For λ 6= un ∈ Sn and the rebalancing polytope Ωn,λ, the minimum distance
from identity In of any rebalancing transform P ∈ Ωn,λ is a product of T -transforms.
Based on a private correspondence with the authors of Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold
(2011), the problem of characterizing the closest element to an identity matrix within
a given polytope has not been tackled in linear algebra. Our characterization through
T -transforms can hence be of interest to mathematicians and economists working with
inequalities and the theory of majorization in general.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed mathematically and economically sound choice theoretic foundations
for the naive approach to diversification. In particular, we axiomatized naive diversifica-
tion by defining it as a preference for equality over inequality and showed that it has a
utility representation in terms of Schur-concave functions, which capture the idea of being
inequality averse on top of being risk averse. The notion of permutation invariance lies at
the core of our naive diversification axiom, since an economic agent with monotonic and
continuous preferences is a naive diversifier if and only if his preferences are convex and
permutation indifferent. Finally, we showed that the transformations, which rebalance un-
equal decision weights to equality, are characterized in terms of their implied turnover, and
that the least possible turnover is obtained by applying a finite number of T -transforms.
We conclude by briefly discussing the relationship between our axiomatic system and
observed behavior in reality, followed by sketching some potential choice theoretic exten-
sions of our work.
6.1 Testing the reality of naive diversification
Even though desirability for diversification is a cornerstone of a broad range of portfolio
choice models, the precise formal definition differs from model to model. Analogously,
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the way in which the notion of diversification is interpreted and implemented in the real
world varies greatly. Traditional diversification paradigms are consistently violated in
practice. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that economic agents often choose diver-
sification schemes other than those implied by Markowitz’s portfolio theory or expected
utility theory. Diversification heuristics thus span a vast range, and naive diversification,
in particular, has been widely documented both empirically and experimentally.
However, despite the growing literature pointing to the common existence of naive
diversification in practice, experimental research investigating the behavioral drivers of
diversifiers remains rather limited. Our axiomatization can help empirical and experimen-
tal economists test diversification preferences, and their underlying drivers, of economic
agents in the real world. In particular, we can now look for the main parameters driving
the decision process of naive diversifiers. One such parameter or heuristic implied by our
axiomatization is that of permutation invariance. In practice, it is arguably rather rare
that a diversifier would know so little about the given assets to be essentially indifferent
among them. Despite this, naive diversification continues to be applied by both experi-
enced professionals and regular people. By varying the amount of information available to
subjects in an experimental setting, one may be able to deduce whether the indifference
axiom applies in general or whether it is information dependent, as implied by Laplace’s
principle of indifference. Another insight gained through our axiomatization was that of
consistency with traditional convex diversification and concave expected utility maximiza-
tion. In particular, consider that a risk averse investor would in theory be expected to
diversify in the traditional convex sense. Hence, the level of risk aversion may be yet
another parameter driving naive diversification, and this again can be directly tested.
6.2 Choice-theoretic generalizations
Comparing allocations among different numbers of choices. Our discussion of
naive diversification throughout has focused on a fixed number of choice alternatives n.
Suppose that an economic agent is faced with an allocation among either x = (x1, . . . , xn)
or y = (y1, . . . , ym), where n 6= m. In Section 3, we showed that an equal allocation
among a larger number of alternatives is always more preferred under naive diversification.
More generally, however, given unequal choice weights α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn and β =
(β1, . . . , βm) ∈ Sm and allocations α ·x and β ·y, one can cannot infer a preference of one
over the other without generalizing the naive diversification axiom. Such an extension has
been developed by Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2011) in the context of the majorization
order on vectors of unequal lengths. In fact, they showed that the components of α are
less spread out than the components of β if and only if the Lorenz curve Lα associated
with the vector α is greater or equal than the Lorenz curve Lβ associated with β for all
values in its domain [0, 1], and that this is equivalent to requiring that 1/n
∑n
i=1 φ(αi) ≤
1/m
∑m
i=1 φ(βi) for all convex functions φ : R→ R.
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Multidimensional diversification. One may think of naive diversification as being
univariate, in the sense that a naive diversifier is concerned with only one dimension,
namely that of equality of choice weights. Suppose that an economic agent would like
to diversify naively, but would also like to reduce variability along a second dimension.
Consider for example the dimension of “risk weights” as opposed to “capital weights”.
This is a commonly applied risk diversification strategy in practice, known under risk
parity. Parity diversification focuses on allocation of risk, usually defined as volatility,
rather than allocation of capital. Here, risk contributions across choice alternatives are
equalized (and are in practice typically levered to match market levels of risk). It can be
viewed as a middle ground between the naive approach and the minimum risk approach
(see for example Maillard, Roncalli, and Teiletche (2010)).
When allocations along more than one dimension are to be compared simultaneously,
we move from the linear space of choice vectors to the space of choice matrices. Each row
of a choice matrix represents a particular attribute or dimension, whereas each column
represents the choice weights along that dimension. The generalization of the mathemati-
cal formalism of naive diversification is then straightforward. For example, a choice matrix
X is more diversified (along some given dimensions) than a choice matrix Y if X = PY
for some doubly stochastic matrix P . This definition is part of an established field within
linear algebra known as multivariate majorization.
Towards an inequality aversion coefficient. The naive diversification axiom implies
that a weight allocation that is closest to the equal weighted vector un is always more
preferred. This in turn induces the idea of being averse to inequality, which we discussed
in Section 4. One may formalize this notion, together with a characterization of different
levels of inequality aversion as follows.
First, yet another generalization of naive diversification can be obtained by substituting
a more general vector d ∈ Sn for the equality vector un. In that case, weight allocations
closest to d are preferred. To do this, we need to define the concept of d-stochastic matrix.
For d ∈ Sn, an n×n matrix A = (aij) is said to be d-stochastic if (i) aij ≥ 0 for all i, j ≤ n;
(ii) dA = d; and (iii) Au′n = u
′
n. To get an intuition for d-stochastic matrices, note that
since
∑n
i=1 di = 1 by construction, a d-stochastic matrix in our setting can be viewed as
the transition matrix of a Markov chain. Clearly, when d = un, a d-stochastic matrix is
doubly stochastic. One can then say that a preference relation % exhibits preference for
relative naive diversification if there is a weight allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Sn such that
for any α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn and β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Sn,
α ≤m β ⇐⇒ α = βA
for some d-stochastic matrix A. The interpretation here is that an individual with naive
diversification preferences relative to some d 6= un is less averse to inequality than one
with naive diversification preferences.
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To be then able to compare levels of aversion to inequality within relative naive di-
versification preferences, we can introduce the coefficient of inequality aversion. For naive
diversification preferences relative to d ∈ Sn, the corresponding inequality aversion co-
efficient ε is defined as ε = ‖d− un‖, where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm taken up-to-
permutation. Clearly, this inequality aversion coefficient ε lies within [0,∞), with ε = 0
for naive diversification preferences, in which case we can say that the decision maker
possesses absolute aversion to inequality.
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